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OPINION 
______________
 
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Appellant Catherine Willis appeals the final decision 
of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania granting University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh’s (“Children’s”) 
Motion for Summary Judgment on her Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) and Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) claims. For the following 
reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court. 
  
I.  Factual Background and Procedural History 
 A. Factual Background 
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 Viewing the record in a light most favorable to the 
nonmovant, Willis, the facts in this case are as follows. Willis 
worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner (“NNP”) at 
Children’s from August 16, 1993 until her termination on 
January 13, 2012. (A-375). From 2001 until 2011, Willis 
served as co-lead NNP. (A-84, A-87). At all times relevant to 
the instant action, Margaret Lamouree, the nurse manager for 
the newborn intensive care unit (“NICU”) was Willis’s 
supervisor. (A-85–A-86). Lamouree’s supervisors were 
Cynthia Valenta and Diane Hupp. (A-85–A-86). From August 
2011 through January 2012, Children’s issued disciplinary 
warnings to Willis for her conduct in three distinct incidents, 
the relevant details of which are included below. 
  
 The first disciplinary incident took place one morning 
in mid-August 2011. While on duty, Willis received a call 
that she was needed in the room of a patient who had recently 
undergone surgery necessitating an endotracheal tube. (A-
105–A-106). In the hallway on her way to assist the patient, 
Willis passed a nurse who remarked to Willis that the 
patient’s tube must be out. (A-106). In response, Willis stated, 
“[t]hat fuckin [sic] tube better not be out, I’ll fuckin [sic] kill 
someone.” (A-346). The patient’s father was in the room at 
the time, but did not hear Willis’s statement. (A-278–A-279). 
Willis received a final written warning regarding this incident 
in early September, which stated that she would be removed 
from her role as a co-lead NNP.1 (A-344). 
                                              
1  The co-lead NNP role vacated by Willis was not 
permanently filled until September 2012, approximately one 
year after Willis’s demotion, when Becky Graves was named 
to this position. At the time of her promotion, Graves was 
thirty-four years old. (A-289–A-290).  
4 
 
  
 Later that month, after she received the written notice 
of the warning and demotion, Willis attended a meeting at 
which Lamouree and Valenta were present. (A-86–A-87). At 
the meeting, clinical leadership explained that the co-lead 
NNP role was changing to include a greater focus on 
administrative and budgetary duties, rather than patient care. 
(A-87–A-88). Willis was interested and thought she was 
qualified for the role, but felt that Lamouree and Valenta 
coerced her to step down. (A-88). 
  
 The second disciplinary incident took place in early 
January 2012. One evening while Willis was on duty, another 
nurse indicated she was looking for someone to start an 
intravenous line on a patient. Frustrated with the nurse, whom 
Willis believed to be inexperienced, and concerned that there 
was not enough time to look for someone else, Willis started 
the line herself. (A-112). Afterwards, Willis approached the 
NICU clinical leadership to express her concerns about the 
inexperience of some of the nursing staff. (A-113–A-114). 
Willis raised her voice loud enough for the NICU supervisor 
Missy Locke, who was nearby, to hear her. (A-114–A-115). 
A week later, Lamouree sent Jenelle Taylor in Human 
Resources an email summarizing her conversation with Willis 
about the incident. (A-347–A-348). Lamouree’s email stated 
that Willis became defensive when Lamouree told her the 
clinical leaders were offended by how Willis handled the 
situation.  (A-347–A-348). When Lamouree asked Willis if 
she thought that she could have communicated her concerns 
without yelling, Willis said, “[n]ever mind I’m always 
wrong” and walked out of the room. (A-347–A-348). Willis 
denies yelling, but otherwise agrees with Lamouree’s 
characterization of the incident. (A-122–A-125). 
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 The third disciplinary incident occurred one night the 
following week when Willis was near the end of her shift. On 
any shift, all the NICU nurses are split into two teams, blue 
and green. (A-384). Willis, who was assigned to the green 
team that night, received a patient who was assigned to the 
blue team, but did not perform a history and physical or 
complete admission orders, as required. (A-127–A-129). 
There is some confusion about who was supposed to take care 
of these tasks. Willis contends that another nurse, Holly 
Bernardi, who was assigned to the blue team that night, was 
responsible. (A-129).   
 
Concerned that this patient’s care fell through the 
cracks, Hupp called both Willis and Bernardi at home after 
their shifts to discuss the incident. Hupp documented the call 
with Willis in an internal memo. (A-350). Willis told Hupp 
that she thought she had placed the admission orders, but, as 
Bernardi was aware, this was the extent of the responsibility 
Willis assumed. (A-350). The next day, Willis emailed Hupp 
about their conversation the previous night regarding the 
incident, and stated that she put the admission orders in and 
relayed this information to Bernardi. (A-351). Hupp 
forwarded the email to Taylor in Human Resources. (A-351). 
At her deposition, Willis again stated that the patient was 
Bernardi’s and not her responsibility at all, but that she 
completed the admission orders, which Bernardi knew. (A-
127–A-128). Hupp’s internal memo, the contents of which 
Willis does not dispute, indicates that Willis left without 
completing the patient’s admission orders. (A-129, A-350). 
Willis also told Hupp that it was common practice for nurses 
to complete admission orders received at the end of their 
shift, but then pass along the physical and history to those in 
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the oncoming shift. (A-128–29, A-350). When Lamouree 
asked Willis if this is what she did that night, Willis said that 
it had been “very busy” and she was unable to recall to whom 
she had reported about the patient. (A-350). 
 
 Two days after this incident, on January 13, 2012, 
Hupp, Valenta, and Lamouree met with Willis to terminate 
her employment. (A-156, A-342–A-343). Willis was sixty-
one years old at the time of her termination, making her a 
member of a protected class under the ADEA and the PHRA. 
(A-76). 
 
B. Procedural History  
Willis filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) in April 
2012. (A-352–A-355). The EEOC closed Willis’s case and 
issued a right to sue letter in November 2012. (A-38). Willis 
brought suit against Children’s in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania on January 28, 2013. After Children’s filed an 
Answer to the Complaint, Willis filed an Amended 
Complaint, to which Children’s filed an Answer.2 (A-24–A-
                                              
2 Willis’s Amended Complaint includes “Hostile Work 
Environment” in the subheadings for Count 1 (ADEA) and 
Count 2 (PHRA), but does not provide any supporting factual 
allegations for a hostile work environment claim. (A-48–A-
55). Willis’s brief in opposition to Children’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment is similarly silent on a hostile work 
environment claim. (A-206–A-207). As a result, the District 
Court concluded this was a drafting error, and accordingly 
deemed the claim abandoned. (A-2 n.1). Willis does not raise 
a hostile work environment claim on appeal, rendering further 
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26). The District Court, (Flowers Conti, J., C.J.), granted 
Children’s Motion for Summary Judgment on both claims. 
(A-22). This timely appeal followed. (A-1). 
 
II.  Discussion3 
 A.  Standard of Review  
 We exercise plenary review over a district court order 
granting summary judgment. Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. 
of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 643 (3d Cir. 1998). 
Accordingly, we engage in the same analysis as the district 
court initially applied. Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 
F.3d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 2002). We will affirm the grant of 
summary judgment if the moving party has shown that the 
evidentiary material on the record, if reduced to admissible 
evidence, is insufficient to permit the nonmoving party to 
carry its burden of proof. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317, 322–23 (1986). 
  
 On a review of an order granting summary judgment, 
this Court is required to construe all facts and inferences in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 643 n.3 
(quoting Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 762 n.1 (3d Cir. 
1994)). Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant 
                                                                                                     
consideration unnecessary. 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Willis’s 
federal claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1331. It had jurisdiction 
over Willis’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1367(a). We have jurisdiction to review final orders of a 
district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter 
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material 
fact is one that “affect[s] the outcome of the suit under the 
governing law” and could lead a reasonable jury to return a 
verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has 
the burden of demonstrating that the evidentiary record 
presents no genuine issue of material fact. Simpson, 142 F.3d 
at 643 n.3 (quoting Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 762 n.1). Once the 
moving party has done so, to avoid the entry of summary 
judgment against them, the nonmoving party must identify 
facts in the record that would enable them to make a 
sufficient showing on essential elements of their case for 
which they have the burden of proof. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. 
at 323. If, after adequate time for discovery, the nonmoving 
party has not met its burden, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56, the court must enter summary judgment against 
the nonmoving party. Id. at 322–23.  
 
 B. Analysis  
  
 Willis claims Children’s discriminated against her on 
the basis of age, in violation of the ADEA and the PHRA. 
Since this Court has determined that the interpretation of the 
PHRA is identical to that of federal anti-discrimination laws, 
including the ADEA, we present a single analysis for Willis’s 
claims under both statutes.4 Fasold v. Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 
                                              
4  There is an exception “where there is something 
specifically different in its language requiring that [an anti-
discrimination statute] be treated differently.” Fasold v. 
Justice, 409 F.3d 178, 184 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
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184 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., 
Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 2002)); Connors v. Chrysler 
Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 972 (3d Cir. 1998) (“There is no 
need to differentiate between . . . ADEA and PHRA claims 
because . . . the same analysis is used for both.”). 
   
  1. Standard for Age Discrimination Claims  
 The ADEA prohibits employers from “discharg[ing] 
any individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). To succeed on an 
ADEA claim, a plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that age was the “but-for” cause of the 
adverse employment action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 
557 U.S. 167, 177–78 (2009). Age discrimination claims in 
which the plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence proceed 
according to the three-part burden-shifting framework set 
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792 
(1973); Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 
(3d Cir. 1997) (reaffirming the application of a “slightly 
modified version of [McDonnell Douglas] in ADEA cases”). 
  
 Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish 
a prima facie case of discrimination. Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108 
(citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 
(1993)). Satisfying the prima facie elements creates an 
                                                                                                     
Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir. 
2002)). The relevant provisions of the ADEA and the PHRA 
do not provide any indication that this exception applies here. 
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(a). 
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“inference of unlawful discrimination.” Pivirotto v. 
Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Waldron v. SL Indus., Inc., 56 F.3d 491, 494 (3d Cir. 
1995)). The elements of a prima facie case of age 
discrimination are that: (1) the plaintiff is at least forty years 
old; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment 
decision; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the position in 
question; and (4) the plaintiff was ultimately replaced by 
another employee who was sufficiently younger so as to 
support an inference of a discriminatory motive. Burton v. 
Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013). This Court 
has indicated the prima facie case is not “intended to be rigid, 
mechanized, or ritualistic.” Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 352 
(quoting Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 
(1978)). Where the plaintiff is not directly replaced, the fourth 
element is satisfied if the plaintiff can provide facts which “if 
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the 
consideration of impermissible factors.” Id.  
  
 Once the plaintiff has successfully established a prima 
facie case creating an inference of discrimination, the burden 
shifts to the employer who must “articulate a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment 
action.” Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 412 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citing Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108). This second step 
of McDonnell Douglas does not require that the employer 
prove that the articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
was the actual reason for the adverse employment action. 
Instead, the employer must provide evidence that will allow 
the factfinder to determine that the decision was made for 
nondiscriminatory reasons. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. 
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 If the employer satisfies this second step, the burden 
shifts back once more to the plaintiff to show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the employer’s proffered 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Burton, 
707 F.3d at 426–27. In Fuentes v. Perskie, this Court 
recognized two ways in which a plaintiff can demonstrate that 
the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was 
pretextual. 32 F.3d at 762. The first way to show pretext is for 
the plaintiff to point to evidence that would allow a factfinder 
to disbelieve the employer’s reason for the adverse 
employment action. Id. at 765. In order to raise sufficient 
disbelief, the evidence must indicate “such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons” 
to satisfy the factfinder that the employer’s actions could not 
have been for nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. Alternatively, 
the second way a plaintiff can establish pretext is to point to 
evidence that would allow a factfinder to believe that an 
invidious discriminatory reason was “more likely than not a 
motivating or determinative cause” of the employer’s action. 
Id. at 764. Specifically, the plaintiff can show pretext this way 
by presenting evidence “with sufficient probative force” so as 
to allow the factfinder to “conclude by a preponderance of the 
evidence that age was a motivating or determinative factor.” 
Simpson, 142 F.3d at 644–45 (citing Keller, 130 F.3d at 
1111). Pointing to evidence demonstrating any of the 
following satisfies this second way to prove pretext: (1) the 
defendant previously discriminated against the plaintiff; (2) 
the defendant discriminated against others within the 
plaintiff’s protected class; or (3) the defendant has treated 
similarly situated, substantially younger individuals more 
favorably. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d 
at 765). If this step is satisfied, at trial the plaintiff must 
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convince the factfinder that not only was the employer’s 
proffered reason false, but the real reason was impermissible 
discrimination. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (quoting St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 515). 
  
   a. Prima Facie Case 
 Since the parties agree that Willis has satisfied the first 
three elements of a prima facie case, the only element at issue 
is the fourth: whether Willis has presented evidence that 
raises an inference of age discrimination. (A-10). Willis 
claims that she has satisfied this element by demonstrating 
that Children’s treated similarly situated, but substantially 
younger, individuals more favorably. (Appellant Br. 10). The 
District Court rejected this argument, finding the evidence 
Willis provided “would not permit an inference of intentional 
discrimination.” 5  (A-13). Accordingly, the District Court 
                                              
 5 In the proceedings below, Willis asserted that there 
were three ways she satisfied the fourth element of her prima 
facie case. First, Willis claimed that she satisfied this element 
because Graves, a substantially younger employee, replaced 
her as co-lead NNP. The District Court rejected this argument 
since at the time of her termination, Willis was no longer co-
lead NNP. (A-11). Second, Willis contended that Children’s 
hiring three NNPs, all of whom were substantially younger 
than her, satisfied this element. The District Court concluded 
that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support 
this contention since Willis had not provided information 
about these employee’s ages, or more importantly, that they 
assumed Willis’s duties. (A-11). Third, Willis advanced the 
sole argument she raises on appeal, that she satisfied the 
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found that Willis had not “adduced sufficient evidence to 
establish a prima facie case.”6 (A-13). 
 On appeal, Willis renews her claim that the evidence 
she provided raises an inference of discrimination that 
Children’s treated similarly situated, substantially younger 
employees more favorably. (Appellant Br. 10). To 
demonstrate more favorable treatment of similarly situated, 
substantially younger employees, Willis references the three 
disciplinary incidents, and cites the lack of discipline for 
substantially younger employees engaging in the same or 
similar conduct. (Appellant Br. 10–12). However, with 
respect to the first incident in August 2011, Willis states 
“[t]here is no . . . indication on the record that any 
substantially younger employee was ever reported for using 
profanity, much less disciplined for it.” (Appellant Br. 11). 
With respect to the second incident, which took place in early 
January 2012, Willis also admits that “[t]here is nothing on 
the record to indicate that there are any similarly situated 
employees of any age who were accused, falsely or not, of 
raising their voices or yelling at Clinical Leaders.” (Appellant 
Br. 11). Willis’s reference here to the lack of discipline goes 
against her argument of more favorable treatment of younger 
employees, since she admits there is no evidence that anyone, 
                                                                                                     
fourth element because Children’s treated similarly situated, 
substantially younger employees more favorably. (A-12). 
  
 6  Because Willis’s Amended Complaint did not cite 
the demotion from co-lead NNP as an adverse employment 
event, the District Court did not treat it as such and instead 
found that Willis’s termination was an adverse employment 
action, in satisfaction of the third element of a prima facie 
case, with which Children’s agreed. (A-10 n.3).  
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including employees her own age, committed these same 
infractions and escaped discipline. (Appellant Br. 11). In 
conceding this, Willis admits that there is no evidence to 
support her point, but attempts to use this omission in her 
favor. 
  
 The argument that the absence of disciplinary incidents 
involving younger staff members is evidence of more 
favorable treatment, defies this Court’s precedent and logic. 
This Court has emphasized that evidence of more favorable 
treatment cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but rather that the 
record must be viewed as a whole. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645–
46. Viewing the record in its entirety, which includes Willis’s 
documented issues with communication and interpersonal 
skills, this argument works against Willis. (A-179–A-181, A-
337). Instead of showing disparate treatment of Willis as an 
employee in a protected class, the record, particularly the 
three disciplinary incidents, supports the concerns of Willis’s 
supervisors that she had difficulty working appropriately with 
others. The record does not reveal any evidence of similarly 
situated, substantially younger employees experiencing 
similar difficulties and not receiving discipline. (Appellant 
Br. 11). 
  
 Assessing the other portions of the record Willis cites 
in support of her case, she has not pointed to any other 
evidence that gives rise to the inference that she was 
terminated due to age discrimination. Willis’s argument that 
Children’s discriminated against her on the basis of age is 
rooted in her own belief that this was the reason for her 
termination, but she is unable to point to any supporting 
evidence. Willis concedes that she cannot identify anything 
Lamouree, Hupp, or Valenta ever said that would suggest an 
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age bias in general, or specifically with respect to Willis. (A-
138–A-139). In fact, when questioned at her deposition about 
the role her age played in her employment at Children’s, the 
only conversation Willis recalled ever having with her 
supervisors was a statement she made once that she planned 
to work until age sixty-five. (A-136–A-138). A passing 
reference to retirement age and Willis’s own belief that age 
discrimination occurred do not comprise sufficient evidence 
that similarly situated, substantially younger employees were 
more favorably treated, and therefore do not satisfy the fourth 
element of a prima facie case. See Pivirotto, 191 F.3d at 352. 
  
   b.  Pretext 
 The District Court found that even assuming, 
arguendo, that Willis established a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, her claims still ultimately failed because she 
did not demonstrate pretext. (A-13). At the second step of 
McDonnell Douglas, Children’s cited the three disciplinary 
incidents as legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for 
terminating Willis’s employment. (A-13). The District Court 
found that these reasons satisfied Children’s burden, stating 
“the nature and documentation of these disciplinary incidents, 
and their acknowledgement by Willis . . . [are] sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find that Children’s dismissed Willis for 
reasons other than her age.” (A-13). Willis responds that these 
reasons are riddled with inconsistencies such that a 
reasonable factfinder could find said reasons were pretext for 
discrimination. (Appellant Br. 15). As for the first way a 
plaintiff can prove pretext, the District Court found that 
Willis failed to present evidence from which a rational 
factfinder could determine that Children’s legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons with respect to all three incidents 
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“were unworthy of credence.” (A-15) (quoting Fuentes, 32 
F.3d at 765) (discussing the mid-August 2011 incident); (A-
17) (discussing the early January 2012 incident); (A-18) 
(discussing the mid-January 2012 incident). Looking at the 
second way a plaintiff can prove pretext, the District Court 
found that Willis did not provide evidence for any of the three 
possible ways a plaintiff can demonstrate that an 
impermissible discrimination was more likely than not the 
determinative cause of the challenged action. (A-18–A-21). 
  
 Assessing the record in the light most favorable to 
Willis, we conclude that she has not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reasons Children’s offered were pretext for 
discrimination. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763. As the District 
Court correctly noted, at the pretext stage it is not a court’s 
role to “rul[e] on the strength of cause for discharge. The 
question is not whether the employer made the best, or even a 
sound, business decision; it is whether the real reason is 
[discrimination].” (A-15) (alterations in original) (quoting 
Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Willis’s attempt to cast Children’s articulated reasons as 
pretext are unsuccessful because she does not point to 
evidence that demonstrates Children’s did not in fact rely on 
its articulated reasons when terminating her employment. See 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765–67. 
  
    i.  First Method of Proving  
     Pretext 
 
  Assessing the three disciplinary incidents for evidence 
sufficient for a factfinder to disbelieve the employer’s 
articulated reasons, this Court concludes that Willis is unable 
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to show that her supervisors did not actually rely on her 
conduct to discipline her and ultimately terminate her 
employment. For the August 2011 incident, Willis does not 
dispute that she violated hospital policy by using profanity in 
close proximity to families and patients. (A-346); (Appellant 
Br. 5). Instead, she attempts to mitigate her own actions by 
suggesting that others have committed the same infraction, 
citing the “fairly commonplace” use of profanity at 
Children’s. (A-118).  Willis also asserts that because the 
patient’s father did not hear the profanity, Lamouree’s 
discipline was improper. (Appellant Br. 14). Willis’s focus on 
whether the patient’s family heard her outburst is misplaced 
in the context of this Court’s pretext analysis. It does not 
matter whether the family heard, or even if she was directly in 
front of the patient’s family. Rather, it matters whether 
Willis’s use of profanity was the reason Lamouree disciplined 
Willis. Since Willis admits to the disciplined conduct, and in 
light of Children’s goal of maintaining the NICU as an 
environment in which patients and their families feel safe,7 
                                              
7 Willis emphasizes that the patient’s family did not 
hear her use profanity, however the warning she received did 
not cite the family hearing her as the basis for the discipline. 
Rather, the warning stated, in relevant part: “On 8/19/11, 
several staff members witnessed, and upon questioning, you 
admit to using inappropriate language including the use of the 
word “fuck” while in close proximity to patients and 
families.” (A-185). Based on the language of the warning, it 
appears that Children’s disciplined Willis because of the very 
act of using such language in close proximity to patients and 
families. (Appellee Br. 21–22). Since this uncontroverted act 
is a sufficient basis for discipline, Willis’s arguments about 
Lamouree’s failure to ascertain if the family heard is 
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Willis has not shown that Lamouree’s reason for discipline is 
so weak as to render it “unworthy of credence.” See Fuentes, 
32 F.3d at 765 (quoting Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-
Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531 (3d Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); (A-180). 
 
 Willis also does not present evidence that renders 
implausible Children’s decision to terminate Willis because 
of the other two disciplinary incidents. As the District Court 
noted, the relevant question with respect to Willis’s early 
January confrontation with the NICU leadership is not 
whether Willis actually yelled, which she denies doing, but 
whether Lamouree believed Willis treated staff members 
inappropriately and imposed discipline for that reason. (A-
15). In light of Willis’s employment record, she has not 
shown that “[t]he notion that talking loudly could be the basis 
for discipline is so ludicrous that it cannot possibly be a 
rational employer’s true reason for acting.” (A-16) (quoting 
Appellant Br. 14) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is 
rational, as the District Court aptly noted, that Lamouree 
“perceived [this incident] to be another instance of harsh or 
offensive interpersonal communication by Willis.” (A-16). 
Six months prior to the incident, in Willis’s performance 
review, Lamouree told her that she needed to “improve her 
communication style, which can be harsh and critical.” (A-
337). Lamouree stated that before this incident she had 
received numerous complaints from both nurses and 
physicians about Willis’s “condescending and harsh style.” 
(A-180). Among the reasons Lamouree cited for asking Willis 
to step down from co-lead NNP were her treatment of staff 
and subordinate nurses. (A-180–A-181). Based on the record, 
                                                                                                     
irrelevant. (Appellant Br. 13).   
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it was not “ludicrous,” as Willis contends, for Lamouree to 
discipline her for this incident. 
  
 With respect to the third disciplinary incident 
involving the incomplete admission orders, Children’s 
discipline of Willis but not Bernardi does not demonstrate 
that the discipline was “so plainly wrong that it [could not] 
have been the employer’s real reason.” Keller, 130 F.3d at 
1109. Willis argues that Bernardi was just as culpable, if not 
more so, despite the two nurse’s different actions and 
responses to Hupp following the incident. Willis 
communicated to Hupp that she told Bernardi she “had 
handled the admission” of the baby and “taken care of it.” (A-
350). Bernardi confirms that Willis did tell her this. (A-359). 
Bernardi told Hupp she checked in about the patient before 
the end of her shift and asked Willis if she needed to do 
anything, to which Willis responded “no, he’s fine.” (A-359).  
Based on the communication between Bernardi and Willis, it 
appears Bernardi had reason to think Willis had assumed 
responsibility, regardless of whether the patient came in on 
the blue or green team. Subsequently, Willis’s failure to 
complete the admission orders, which she incorrectly told 
Hupp she had finished, does not show an inconsistency in 
Children’s discipline. Bernardi, unlike Willis, did not 
explicitly assume responsibility for a patient and leave her 
shift without discharging the attendant tasks. (A-359). The 
evidence to which Willis points fails to create sufficient 
disbelief so that a factfinder could rationally find that 
Children’s did not rely on these reasons in disciplining Willis. 
  
    ii. Second Method of Proving  
     Pretext  
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 As for the second way this Court has recognized a 
plaintiff can establish pretext, Willis has not presented 
evidence that supports any of the three categories that would 
allow a factfinder to believe unlawful discrimination was 
more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of 
her termination. As noted above, Willis was unable to point to 
any evidence that Children’s previously discriminated against 
her on the basis of age. (A-138). The sole conversation 
involving age, which was limited to Willis’s comment about 
when she planned to retire, does not support discrimination 
on Children’s part. (A-137–A-138). As the District Court 
noted, it is common business practice, and not impermissible 
discrimination, for an employer to inquire about retirement 
plans in anticipation of staffing needs. (A-19). 
   
 Unable to identify any statements by neonatal nurse 
leadership indicating an age bias, Willis asserts that 
leadership replacing experienced staff with inexperienced 
nurses constitutes evidence that Children’s has discriminated 
against others within her protected class. (A-138–A-141). 
Willis’s argument fails in light of her admission that the 
experienced staff Children’s replaced were not fired, but left 
voluntarily, without conditions suggesting age discrimination. 
(A-139–A-140). Natural staff turnover and increased hiring 
related to expansion do not support Willis’s argument that 
Children’s discriminated against others in her protected class. 
  
Moreover, the allegedly commonplace nature of 
profanity at Children’s and unconfirmed rumors regarding the 
non-discipline of another nurse for “abruptness” and 
“sarcas[m]” do not constitute evidence that similarly situated, 
substantially younger employees were treated more favorably. 
(A-118–A-120). The only support Willis provides for the 
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assertion that many employees use profanity and did not 
receive similar treatment is her statement that “[t]here is . . . 
no indication on the record that any substantially younger 
employee was ever reported for using profanity, much less 
disciplined for it.” (Appellant Br. 11). As noted previously, 
this alleged lack of discipline does not provide sufficient 
support for Willis’s assertion of more favorable treatment. 
Willis also cited “scuttlebutt” among the nursing staff that 
another NNP was reported to management for abruptness and 
sarcasm.8 (A-119–A-120). Even if this rumor is true, Willis’s 
second-hand account does not provide evidence of more 
favorable treatment towards a similarly situated, substantially 
younger employee. The rumored conduct, involving 
abruptness and sarcasm, is not the same as the use of 
profanity in close proximity to patients and their families. 
                                              
8 Willis stated in her deposition that she believes the 
subject of this rumor to be Becky Graves, who as discussed 
supra, note 1, is substantially younger than Willis. (A-119). 
The extent of Willis’s knowledge on the matter is that Graves 
was reported to Lamouree by other nurses, but Willis is not 
sure who reported Graves. Willis stated in her deposition that 
she believes Children’s did not discipline Graves for this 
reported incident, but Willis admitted her knowledge of this is 
solely “scuttlebutt” from the NNPs. (A-120).  
Willis raised the issue of the non-discipline of Graves 
in the proceedings below, but does not discuss it in her brief 
on appeal. Because Willis argues that more favorable 
treatment of similarly situated, substantially younger 
employees provides evidence supporting pretext, we address 
it here, assuming it is not waived, as part of the larger 
analysis regarding this category of evidence.   
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Willis does not argue that this conduct was similarly in 
violation of hospital policy, or as serious in its impact on the 
hospital environment. 
  
More importantly, Willis is unable to provide specifics 
to establish that this other employee was in fact not 
disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. 
In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general 
rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is 
insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While this 
Court has acknowledged that evidence demonstrating that a 
single member of a non-protected group received more 
favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely 
affecting an older employee does not become a 
discriminatory decision merely because one younger 
employee is treated differently.” Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645–
46. Setting aside the lack of corroboration regarding this 
incident, the evidence Willis provides on the other 
employee’s non-discipline is not appropriate at the pretext 
stage “where the factual inquiry into the alleged 
discriminatory motives of the employer has risen to a new 
level of specificity.” Id. at 646 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr., 
509 U.S. at 516). This rumored, unspecified, and 
uncorroborated evidence concerning a single employee fails 
to establish pretext. Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Children’s on 
both claims.9 
                                              
9 At deposition, Willis admitted that after Children’s 
terminated her employment, she did not apply for a single job 
as a NNP, or even in the nursing or health care field, because, 
as she stated at her deposition, she was “very devastated and 
very much turned off and soured by what nursing had done to 
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III. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the final 
judgment of the District Court dated February 10, 2015. 
                                                                                                     
[her] and didn’t want to put [her]self in that position.” (A-80). 
Because we hold that Willis did not establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination, and would not be able to succeed 
at the pretext stage if she were to meet her prima facie 
burden, we do not reach Children’s argument that even if 
Willis succeeded under the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
she could not recover front or back pay for failure to mitigate 
damages. (Appellee Br. 24–25).  
